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The Disability Tax Credit: Exploring Attitudes, Perceptions, and
Beliefs About Disability
TAMARA LARRE*
Cet article porte sur le crédit d’impôt pour personnes handicapées (CIPH), l’un des rares
programmes fédéraux à offrir un financement direct aux personnes en situation de
handicap. Cet article vise à analyser ce que révèle le CIPH sur les attitudes, les
perceptions et les croyances à l’égard des handicaps. Il s’agit d’une importante
contribution à la littérature, puisque les universitaires œuvrant dans le domaine du
handicap ont montré à quel point les forces sociétales comme les attitudes, les
perceptions et les croyances à l’égard des handicaps jouent elles-mêmes un rôle sur
ceux-ci. En comparant les attitudes, les perceptions et les croyances des législateurs et
des juges aux points de vue exprimés dans la littérature sur les handicaps, cet article
révèle les stéréotypes blessants qui ne tiennent pas compte des différentes réalités des
personnes en situation de handicap. De plus, l’article témoigne du désaccord qui existe
entre quatre groupes, soit les universitaires du domaine du handicap, les législateurs, les
juges et les contribuables, sur des questions comme la définition de « handicap » et les
politiques appropriées pour encadrer la réalité des handicaps. L’auteure considère ce
désaccord comme inquiétant, puisqu’il pourrait nuire à l’élaboration progressiste des
politiques et à la clarté juridique. L’absence d’un consensus sur l’objectif du CIPH
entrave entre autres son évaluation et son interprétation. Le CIPH est-il destiné à servir
de soutien au revenu des personnes en situation de handicap (c’est-à-dire à servir de
dépense fiscale) ou à prendre en considération les coûts qui nuisent à la capacité de payer
(c’est-à-dire à servir de disposition formelle)? D’autres discussions et enquêtes
s’imposent quant au CIPH et aux questions générales liées aux handicaps soulevées dans
cet article.
This article examines the disability tax credit (DTC), one of the few federal programs
providing direct funding to persons with disabilities. The goal of the article is to explore
the DTC as a window into attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs about disability. This is an
important contribution to the literature as disability scholars have shown how societal
forces, such as attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs about disability, contribute to disability
itself. Through comparing attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs of legislators and judges
with the views expressed in the disability literature, the article reveals harmful
stereotypes that fail to take into account the diverse realities of those experiencing
disability. Further, the article shows a lack of agreement between four groups: disability
scholars, legislators, judges, and taxpayers, on issues relating to the meaning of disability
and the appropriate policy response to disability. The author contends this disagreement
is troublesome as it may impede progressive policymaking and legal clarity. In
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particular, the evaluation and interpretation of the DTC is hindered by the lack of
agreement about whether the DTC is intended to serve as income support for persons
with disability (thus, operating as a tax expenditure), or to take into account costs
negatively impacting ability to pay (thus, operating as a technical provision.) Further
discussion and investigation of the DTC and the broader disability-related questions
raised in this article are warranted.

THE CURRENT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS SHOWN AN INTEREST in disability issues,
raising their profile within cabinet and charging the Minister of Sport and Persons with
Disabilities with creating new accessibility legislation.1 This bringing of disability issues to the
forefront presents a timely opportunity to examine how our society views disability. This article
examines the disability tax credit (DTC), one of the few federal programs providing direct
funding to persons with disabilities.2 The goal of the article is not to perform a full policy
analysis of the DTC, but rather to explore the DTC as a window into attitudes, perceptions, and
beliefs about disability. This is an important contribution to the literature as disability scholars
have shown how societal forces, such as attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs about disability,
contribute to disability.3 As others have pointed out, “attitudes disable.”4 The social construction
of disability may be reflected in language used to describe persons with disabilities and
assumptions relied upon when making and discussing policies and laws.5 Comparing these
attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs with the views expressed in the disability literature can reveal
harmful stereotypes that fail to take into account the diverse realities of those experiencing
disability. Further, where there is a lack of agreement between the various subsets of society, the
conflict may impede progressive policymaking and legal clarity. Conflicting views can also have
a negative impact on the integrity of the tax system if they give rise to perceived unfairness of its
provisions or their application.
In this article, I study (1) the disability and tax scholarship, (2) the DTC itself, and (3)
recent case law on the DTC in order to gain an understanding of the attitudes, perceptions, and
beliefs of scholars, legislators, judges, and individual taxpayers concerning two linked questions.
The first question—what is disability?—encompasses questions including who is disabled, who

Employment and Social Development Canada, News Release, “What Does an Accessible Canada Mean to You?”
(22 June 2016), online: <canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/news/2016/06/what-does-an-accessiblecanada-mean-to-you-.html> [perma.cc/PY6J-GSEL]; Letter from Rt. Hon. Justin Trudeau to Mr. Kent Hehr,
Minister of Sport and Persons with Disabilities (October 4, 2017) online: <pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-sport-and-personsdisabilities-mandate-letter> [perma.cc/7UCQ-L879].
2
The other major federal direct support programs are the Canada Pension Plan and the Veterans Disability Pension.
The term “persons with disabilities” is respectfully used here, while recognizing that there are conflicting views on
the preferred term: see Tom Shakespeare, Disability Rights and Wrongs (London: Routledge, 2006) at 32.
3
See discussion of social model in section I.A. Understanding Disability, below.
4
See e.g. Richard Rieser, “Disability Discrimination, the Final Frontier: Disablement, History and Liberation” in
Mike Cole, ed, Education, Equality and Human Rights: Issues of Gender, ‘Race’, Sexuality, Special Needs and
Social Class (New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2000) 118 at 119; Bradley A. Areheart, “Disability Trouble” (2010)
29:2 Yale L & Pol’y Rev 347 at 379.
5
Arlene S Kanter, “The Law: What’s Disability Studies Got to Do with It or An Introduction to Disability Legal
Studies” (2011) 42:2 Colum HRLR 403; Tamara Larre, “Pity the Taxpayer: The Tax Exemption for Personal Injury
Damages as a Disability Policy” (2007) 33:1 Queen’s LJ 217.
1
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gets to decide who is disabled, and the causes and effects of disability. The second question is:
what is the appropriate policy response to disability? Examined in the context of tax policy, this
second question can be more specifically framed as: what effect should disability have on taxes
payable? If the DTC is viewed as the equivalent of a direct spending program that happens to be
implemented through the tax system, it is also appropriate to ask: what financial supports, if any,
should be available to persons with disabilities? The views of the four groups are compared
throughout, and the analysis reveals that the various groups have differing answers to these
questions. I argue that this misalignment of views of the groups is notable and troublesome. My
brief conclusion reiterates that the question of how society should view and respond to disability
should continue to be debated and discussed. It is hoped that this article can make a contribution
to the discourse on disability and tax policy.

I. PERSPECTIVES ON DISABILITY REFLECTED IN THE
SCHOLARSHIP
Here, I review disability and tax scholarship to provide a basic outline of prevailing expert views
on the meaning of disability and the appropriate policy responses to disability. Additional
literature is introduced later in the article to point out inconsistencies between the views of
academics as compared to those of legislators, the judiciary, or taxpayers.

A. UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY
Disability was once understood as the exclusive result of bodily defects, and the policy response
was to grant charity6 and benevolence to those in such tragic circumstances.7 Since the
introduction of the social model of disability in the late 1970s,8 insisting that it was important to
recognize the role society plays in creating and contributing to disability, 9 many disability
scholars have relentlessly discredited and condemned the medical and charitable models of
disability. Although the social model has been subject to a number of criticisms, including its
failure to account for the lived experiences relating to impairment,10 it is clear that disability
scholars no longer see an exclusive focus on impairment as appropriate. Society’s creation of
barriers to full inclusion is an important, if not the paramount, contributor to what we know as
“disability.” Such barriers include negative views of persons with disabilities. For example, Kay

Justin Anthony Haegele & Samuel Hodge, “Disability Discourse: Overview and Critiques of the Medical and
Social Models” (2016) 68:2 Quest 193 at 195.
7
Kanter, supra note 5 at 419–21. Although the tragedy model of disability has been discredited, that is not to say
that impairment can’t be tragic. See Dan Goodley, “Dis/entangling Critical Disability Studies” in Anne
Waldschmidt, Hanjo Berressem & Moritz Ingwersen, eds, Culture-Theory-Disability: Encounters Between
Disability Studies and Cultural Studies (Bielefeld, Germany: Transcript-Verlag, 2017) 81 at 85.
8
Anne Waldschmidt, “Disability Goes Cultural: The Cultural Model of Disability as an Analytical Tool” in
Waldschmidt, Berressem & Ingwersen, supra note 7, 19 at 20.
9
Kanter, supra note 5 at 419–21; Haegele & Hodge, supra note 6 at 196–97.
10
Carol Thomas, Female Forms: Experiencing and Understanding Disability (Philadelphia: Open University Press,
1999); Tom Shakespeare & Nicholas Watson, “The Social Model of Disability: An Outdated Ideology?” in Sharon
N Barnartt & Barbara M Altman, eds, Exploring Theories and Expanding Methodologies: Where We Are and
Where We Need to Go (Oxford: Elsevier Science, 2001) 9; Waldschmidt, supra note 8 at 19–21; Haegele & Hodge,
supra note 6 at 197–98.
6
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Schriner has stated that policies based on assumptions that persons with disabilities are
unproductive, ill, immoral, and incompetent “reflect common misperceptions, myths, and
prejudices about some kinds of individual differences.”11
This shift away from exclusive focus on impairment in the literature has gained
considerable momentum, including among international organizations such as the United
Nations and the World Health Organization, which have acknowledged social contributors to
disability.12 One specific example is the World Health Organization’s International Classification
of Function, Disability and Health (ICF Model), developed based on what it refers to as the
“biopsychosocial model.”13 While the medical model looked only to bodily function, this model
recognizes that it is important to assess how bodily functions affect activities, and ultimately
participation in society, and that external and personal factors influence function, disability, and
health.14

B. SOCIAL POLICY RESPONSES TO DISABILITY
Disability policy, at the highest level, is a response to the issue of how society should treat
disability. Lyn Jongbloed frames the key question as: what does society owe persons with
disabilities? She concludes that we, as a society, have not yet decided.15 Scholars have weighed
in on the appropriate policy response across a variety of disability-related policy issues, and a
brief overview of the literature follows.
What policies are dictated by the social model? David A Weisbach argues that the social
model does not point to a particular policy result.16 However, the indisputable shift from the
medical and charitable models of disability to the social model has played an important role in
discussions about the appropriate policy response.17 For one thing, the shift meant that removing
barriers to full participation in society and achieving autonomy and human dignity18 became seen
as a responsibility of society, through government.19
There is a tension in the disability scholarship between the calls for treatment of persons
with disabilities as equals, and the need to recognize difference as compared to non-disabled
people in order to achieve full participation in society.20 The rise of universalism has perhaps

Kay Schriner, “The Political Implications of the Disability Construct in Public Policy” (2000) 11:2 J Disability
Policy Studies 103 at 104.
12
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, GA Res 61/106, UNGAOR, 61st Sess, Supp No 49, UN
Doc A/Res/61/106; World Health Organization, The International Classification of Functioning, Disability and
Health (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2001), online: <who.int/classifications/icf/en> [perma.cc/5TEEQ5ZA].
13
World Health Organization, supra note 12.
14
Ibid.
15
Lyn Jongbloed, “Disability Policy in Canada: An Overview” (2003) 13:4 J Disability Policy Studies 203 at 207.
16
David A Weisbach, “Toward a New Approach to Disability Law” (2009) 47 U Chicago Legal F at 67, drawing on
the work of Adam M Samaha, “What Good is the Social Model of Disability?” (2007) 74:4 U Chicago L Rev.
17
Waldschmidt, supra note 8 at 21.
18
Jerome Bickenbach, “Universally Design Social Policy: When Disability Disappears?” (2014) 36:16 Disability
and Rehabilitation 1320 at 1323.
19
Laura Wilkinson-Meyers et al, “To Live an Ordinary Life: Resource Needs and Additional Costs for People with
a Physical Impairment” (2015) 30:7 Disability and Society 976 at 989.
20
Theodore P Seto & Sande L Buhai, “Tax and Disability: Ability to Pay and the Taxation of Difference” (2006)
154 U Pa L Rev 1053 at 1071–73.
11
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contributed to this tension. Universalism views human functioning along a continuum and has
emerged, alongside the social model, in opposition to the medical model. Instead of using a
minority group approach (under which some persons would qualify as disabled) and its limited
vision of “normal,” universalism views disability as universal, multidimensional, and variable.21
While subscribers to universalism have advocated for a policy approach that accommodates all
human variation, thus applying universally across all of society,22 others have called for policies
that meet the specific needs of individuals (through, for example, individualized and
personalized direct funding for persons with disabilities).23
Jerome Bickenbach argues that targeted policies are required because the needs of
individuals are varied.24 However, he also recognizes that determining eligibility for targeted
policies is expensive and is usually dependent on the medical opinion of doctors who are not
well informed about disability.25 Others have criticized this use of medical professionals as
gatekeepers for putting the person in a sick role26 and ignoring the social contributors to
disability.27 Another problem noted with targeted policies is that they can incentivize people to
“game the system”28 and trap disabled people in the “disability benefits culture.”29
Scholars have reasoned that direct financial payments to people with disabilities are
consistent with the premises underlying the social model.30 Due to society’s contributions to
disability, it is incumbent upon government to compensate for this through income
redistribution.31 Michael Palmer points out that persons with disabilities are prone to deprivation
for reasons of reduced capacity to earn, additional expenses, and a reduced availability of
household labour due to caregiving by family members.32

Ian Joiner, “Obscuring Disability: The Impact of a Universalism/Minority Group Dichotomy on Assessing
Equality” in Mary Ann McColl & Lyn Jongbloed, eds, Disability and Social Policy in Canada (Concord: Captus
Press, 2006) 87 at 92.
22
Irving Kenneth Zola, “Toward the Necessary Universalizing of a Disability Policy” (1989) 67 Milbank Q 401.
23
Bickenbach, supra note 18; Dave Sims & Joanna Whisker, “Personalisation and Disabled People: The Rhetoric
and the Reality” (2014) 17:3 Social Work & Social Sciences Rev 137; Jennifer Hall-Lande, “County Administrator
Perspectives on the Implementation of Self-Directed Supports” (2012) 22:4 J Disability Policy Studies 247 at 248.
24
Bickenbach, supra note 18 at 1323.
25
Ibid; Haegele & Hodge, supra note 6 at 195–196.
26
Colin Barnes, “Disability, Disability Studies and the Academy” in John Swain et al, eds, Disabling BarriersEnabling Environments, 2nd ed (London: SAGE Publications, 2004) 28 at 29; Haegele & Hodge, supra note 6 at
195–96.
27
See e.g. Anne Crichton & Lyn Jongbloed, Disability and Social Policy in Canada (North York, ON: Captus Press,
1998) at 10; Carol Thomas, Female Forms: Experiencing and Understanding Disability (Philadelphia: Open
University Press, 1999).
28
Bickenbach, supra note 18 at 1323; Simoni Symeonidou, “New Policies, Old Ideas: The Question of Disability
Assessment Systems and Social Policy” (2014) 29:8 Disability & Society 1260 at 1268.
29
Robert E Drake et al, “Mental Health Disability: An International Perspective” (2012) 23:2 J Disability Policy
Studies 110 at 112–13.
30
See e.g. Matthew Diller, “Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the Americans with Disabilities
Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs” (1998) 76:5 Tex L Rev 1003 at 1006–07.
31
Wilkinson-Meyers et al, supra note 19 at 989. Tom Shakespeare argues that redistribution is justified due to a
combination of societal barriers and impairment arising from the “random effect of genes or disease.” See
Shakespeare, supra note 2 at 67.
32
Michael Palmer, “Disability and Poverty: A Conceptual Review” (2011) 21:4 J Disability Policy Studies 210 at
212–13.
21
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C. TAX POLICY RESPONSES TO DISABILITY
In this section, I move from the disability studies literature to the tax policy literature dealing
with disability. A number of tax policy scholars have pointed out that there are two distinct
reasons why tax legislation might respond to disability.33 First, income tax legislation might be
used as a means for implementing a broader social policy, in which case disability-related
provisions would be considered tax expenditures.34 Second, income tax legislation might
recognize disability for tax policy reasons, in which case the provisions would be considered
technical tax provisions implemented to improve the tax system in terms of its primary goals of
“raising revenue and redistributing income.”35
A handful of tax policy articles considering the DTC, all written between 2000 and 2006,
have invariably recognized the need to consider whether the DTC is, or should be, a tax
expenditure, a technical tax provision, or perhaps both.36 In two of the four articles, the writers
preferred to view the DTC as a technical tax provision,37 and in the other instances, the writers
saw the DTC as playing a dual role, as both a tax expenditure and technical tax provision.38
While none of the tax or legal scholars39 identified the DTC as solely a tax expenditure, at least
one article authored by a disability scholar examined the DTC on the assumption that it was a tax
expenditure (without analysis).40 Perhaps this serves as evidence, though limited, that the
perspective of the writer plays an important role in how the credit is viewed as, for tax policy
academics, the question of whether a provision is a tax expenditure is a frequent starting point
for tax policy analysis, whereas for disability scholars, the focus on disability policy leads to a
natural assumption that the DTC be viewed as a tax expenditure. Regardless, it is apparent from
the literature that the DTC could be classified as either a technical tax provision or a tax
expenditure, or perhaps even both concurrently.
The tax expenditure literature clearly indicates that policies placed in the tax system for
purposes other than measuring income should be evaluated according to their non-tax policy
goals.41 That is, just because a policy is in the tax system does not make it immune from analysis

Raquel Chisholm, “The Disability Tax Credit and Amputees: It’s Time for a Reality Check” (2003) 2:1 JL &
Equality 156; Michael Smart & Mark Stabile, “Tax Support for the Disabled in Canada: Economic Principles and
Options for Reform” (2006) 54:2 Can Tax J 407; David Duff, “Disability and the Income Tax” (2000) 45:4 McGill
LJ 797; Seto & Buhai, supra note 20.
34
For a discussion of tax expenditures, see Peter W Hogg, Joanne E Magee & Jinyan Li, Principles of Canadian
Income Tax Law, 9th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2017) at 64–72.
35
Tim Edgar, Arthur Cockfield & Martha O’Brien, eds, Materials on Canadian Income Tax, 15th ed (Toronto:
Carswell, 2015) at 73.
36
Duff, supra note 33; Smart & Stabile, supra note 33; Chisholm, supra note 33; Lisa Philipps, “Disability, Poverty
and the Income Tax: The Case for Refundable Credits” (2001) 16 J L & Soc Pol’y 77.
37
Smart & Stabile, supra note 33 at 408; Duff, supra note 33 at 840. Note that in an American article, Seto and
Buhai view disability-related provisions as technical tax provisions. See supra note 20.
38
Chisholm, supra note 33 at 188; Philipps, supra note 36 at 93.
39
Here, “tax scholars” refers to academics studying tax, including those in the fields of economics, business, and
law, while “legal scholars” refers to academics in the legal field, who may or may not focus their scholarship on
taxation law.
40
Michael J. Prince, “Tax Policy as Social Policy: Canadian Tax Assistance for People with Disabilities” (2001)
27:4 Can Public Pol’y 487.
41
Hogg, Magee & Li, supra note 34 at 65.
33
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as a spending program.42 Therefore, the disability literature on social policy responses to
disability, described in the previous section, should be taken into account if the DTC is evaluated
as a tax expenditure. Additionally, tax scholars have pointed out that the decision to place a
policy within the income tax system comes with some potential benefits (such as built-in income
calculation and the potential for administrative efficiencies)43 as well as potential drawbacks due
to the structure of the income tax system (such as a lack of flexibility relating to application
criteria, amount, and timing).44 Hence, it is important to question whether financial support for
persons with disabilities should be located within the income tax system.
Technical tax provisions are evaluated differently than tax expenditures, usually by
applying three primary criteria: equity, neutrality, and simplicity.45 In the case of disability
provisions, equity is particularly relevant. Horizontal equity requires that taxpayers in the same
position pay the same amount of tax, and vertical equity demands that taxpayers in different
positions pay appropriately different amounts of tax.46 Ability to pay is often used to compare the
relative positions of taxpayers,47 and scholars have argued that it is appropriate to adjust income
for extraordinary disability-related costs because of the resulting decreased ability to pay.48

II. PERSPECTIVES ON DISABILITY REFLECTED IN THE
LEGISLATION
After describing the DTC in this section, I explain how it reflects certain views of disability and
the appropriate policy response to disability. In doing so, I point out discrepancies between views
reflected in the DTC and those reflected in the scholarship.

A. THE DTC AND RELATED CREDITS
Section 118.3 of the Income Tax Act49 (ITA) permits individual taxpayers to claim the DTC
where certain requirements are met. First, under the function impairment requirement, the
individual must have “one or more severe and prolonged impairments in physical or mental
functions.”50 Second, under the marked restriction requirement, the ability to perform at least one
basic activity of daily living must be “markedly restricted,” or would be if not for certain

42

Ibid at 64–65.
Tamara Larre, “The Children’s Fitness Tax Credit: Right Message, Wrong Policy Instrument” in Lisa Philipps,
Neil Brooks & Jinyan Li, eds, Tax Expenditures: State of the Art (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2011) 12:1 at
12:6–7.
44
Ibid at 12:10–11.
45
Hogg, Magee & Li, supra note 34 at 47.
46
Ibid at 49.
47
Ibid.
48
Seto & Buhai, supra note 20 at 1100–03, 1143.
49
RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp), s 118.3 [ITA].
50
Ibid, s 118.3(1)(a). Prolonged is defined as lasting, or expected to last, for a continuous 12-month period (ibid, s
118.4(1)(a)).
43
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essential and regular therapy.51 The activity is markedly restricted where all or substantially all
of the time, even with appropriate devices and medication, the “individual is blind or is unable
(or requires an inordinate amount of time) to perform a basic activity of daily living.”52 Such
basic activities of daily living are defined in the legislation to include, for example, “mental
functions necessary for everyday life,” feeding and dressing oneself, “speaking so as to be
understood” and hearing to understand, eliminating, and walking.53 The definition specifically
excludes working, housekeeping, and social and recreational activities.54
In order to claim the credit against taxes owing, the taxpayer and an appropriate medical
practitioner must fill in a T2201 form to certify that the function impairment and marked
restriction requirements are met,55 and the taxpayer must file the form.56 While the credit is not
refundable,57 where the individual has insufficient income to use it, the DTC may be claimed by
a relative on whom the individual is dependent.58 The amount of the credit, like many other
credits, is indexed for inflation.59 In 2017 the maximum value of the credit was $1,216.60
To understand the role of the DTC, it is important to note that a series of other credits are
also available in relation to disability of the taxpayer or a dependent. The medical expense tax
credit recognizes certain costs, including a number of expenses beyond medical services and
drugs,61 above a certain “floor” amount.62 The caregiver credit, introduced in 2017 as a
consolidation of three credits, is available in varying amounts to caregivers to certain eligible
dependent relatives.63

51

Ibid s 118.3(1)(a.1). Alternatively, the marked restriction requirement can be met where the cumulative effects of
multiple restrictions are considered the equivalent of “having a marked restriction in the ability to perform a basic
activity of daily living” (ibid).
52
Ibid s 118.4(1)(b).
53
Ibid s 118.4(1)(c).
54
Ibid s 118.4(1)(d).
55
Ibid s 118.3(1)(a.2)–(a.3).
56
Ibid s 118.3(1)(b).
57
Credits are applied against taxes owing. Where taxpayers are unable to use up the whole amount of a credit
because they do not have enough taxes owing, a refundable credit will result in the government issuing payment to
the taxpayer for any unused credit amount.
58
Supra note 49, s 118.3(2).
59
Ibid s 117.1.
60
The maximum credit amount is $8,113. See Government of Canada, “Disability Tax Credit” Government of
Canada, online: < canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/tax/individuals/segments/tax-credits-deductions-personsdisabilities/disability-tax-credit.html> [perma.cc/3FPQ-RCDH]. To determine the value, this amount is multiplied
by the lowest marginal rate (ITA, supra note 49, ss 118.3(1), 248(1)), which is equal to 15% (supra note 49, s
117(2)(a)).
61
These include costs of group home care, attendant care, or in-school care (ITA, supra note 49, s 118.2(2)(b)–(e));
atypical renovation and home building costs; van expenses; tutoring; and prescribed devices or equipment (supra
note 49, s 118.2(2)).
62
The credit permits expenses to be claimed in excess of the lesser of 3% of the taxpayer’s net income, and the fixed
amount for that particular year ($2,237 in 2016) (ITA, supra note 49, s 118.2(1), Government of Canada, “T1-2016Federal Tax”, online: <canada.ca/content/dam/cra-arc/migration/cra-arc/E/pbg/tf/5000-s1/5000-s1-fill-16e.pdf> 2
[perma.cc/3GRM-F9FG].
63
ITA, supra note 49, s 118(1)(b)(iv), s 118(1)(b.1), and 118(1)(d)).. supporting minor children with disabilities
(supra note 49, s 118(1)(b.1)); and a dependent adult credit for taxpayers supporting dependent adults (supra note
49, s 118(1)(d)).
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B. LEGISLATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE MEANING OF DISABILITY
What can we glean about the way that drafters viewed disability from looking at the DTC itself?
One could posit that legislators had a binary understanding of disability; that is, that the
population can be divided into disabled (entitled to the credit) and non-disabled (not entitled to
the credit). This is entirely inconsistent with the human variation or universalism model of
disability in the literature.64 The DTC has also been criticized for perpetuating the medical
model, which focuses on the impairment and deviations from a norm.65
By focusing on the level of impairment and its effect on basic functions as opposed to the
effects on participation in society, the DTC appears to either: (1) be based on pity or charity (that
is, anyone with a certain impairment deserves to be compensated for their disability) or (2) to
correlate the level of impairment with the financial costs of disability. The former, based on pity
or charity, is inappropriate, and the latter is certainly a very rough estimate. Equating impairment
with disability-related costs is also inconsistent with the social model because it largely leaves
societal factors out of the equation. Put in another way, the DTC’s focus on impairment and
basic functioning ignores important aspects of disability by failing to look to the effect of
functional limitations on the individual’s participation in society, considering relevant contextual
factors. Joseph J Chen references the ICF Model66 and points out that traditional functional
assessments miss out on the participation element, which is not just affected by bodily functional
limitations, but also by external and personal elements of disability.67 This point is directly
applicable to the DTC. For example, if one compares two people with the same impairments and
functional restrictions, including an inability to drive a car, but one lives in an area with widely
available, inexpensive, and accessible public transit and the other does not, the latter will
experience greater disability and disability-related costs because of the different environment.
These differences do not affect eligibility for, or amount of, the DTC.

C. LEGISLATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLICY RESPONSE TO
DISABILITY
By enacting the DTC, legislators must have thought it appropriate for persons with disabilities to
be given beneficial tax treatment (1) in the form of a non-variable credit amount, (2) if they (or a
close family member) otherwise have taxes payable, and (3) so long as a medical professional
finds specific criteria are met. Below, each of these three aspects of the DTC is examined, after
first discussing the legislative purpose behind the DTC.
As previously discussed in section I.C., the DTC is most often classified by policy
scholars as a technical tax provision, as opposed to a tax expenditure. 68 The Technical Advisory
Committee on Tax Measures for Persons with Disabilities explained that tax measures for
persons with disabilities are “not meant to subsidize or offset … [disability-related] costs, but
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rather to achieve equity and greater fairness in the allocation of the tax burden.” 69 The reference
to equity and fairness in allocating the tax burden indicates that the DTC was implemented to
measure income, and therefore should be characterized as a technical tax provision. On the other
hand, there are reasons to question the Technical Advisory Committee’s statement, as there are a
couple of features, namely its nature as a credit rather than a deduction and its inclusion in the
tax expenditure report, that indicate that the legislators intended the DTC to operate as a social
policy measure, and thus a tax expenditure. However, the inclusion in the tax expenditure
report70 cannot be used as conclusive proof that the DTC was intended to serve a non-tax policy
purpose as there are differing views on how to define tax expenditures, and Canada’s tax
expenditure report takes a broad approach to identifying tax expenditures.71 Thus, there is
uncertainty surrounding the intended legislative purpose of the DTC.
1. THE TAXPAYER OR A RELATED CAREGIVER MUST OTHERWISE HAVE TAXES
PAYABLE
As a non-refundable, transferable credit, the DTC can only be used against taxes payable by the
taxpayer or a close family member upon whom she or he is dependent. Assuming the DTC is a
technical tax provision based on reduced ability to pay, the tax policy literature suggests that the
credit should instead be in the form of a deduction from income (and therefore, like a nonrefundable credit, would only be of use where taxes were payable).72 However, where expenses
are difficult to itemize, some have pointed out that a standard amount may be more appropriate.73
If the DTC is a tax expenditure, then the literature would tend to support a policy based
on disability-related costs and/or reduced capacity to earn income.74 In no way do these connect
to income of the disabled person or a caregiver. In fact, those with the greatest costs and lowest
capacity to earn are unlikely to have sufficient income to use a credit, and will be in greatest
need if they do not have a caregiver with sufficient income to use the credit. Therefore, the calls
to make the credit refundable75 are well-founded if it is viewed as a tax expenditure.
Maintaining its form as a credit, as opposed to a deduction, makes sense if it is viewed as
a tax expenditure because a deduction would be worth more to those who need it the least (the
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“upside-down effect”).76 However, even if it were a refundable credit, using the income tax
system to provide income support could be challenged because it would not reach people who do
not file tax returns.77
2. ALL QUALIFIED TAXPAYERS RECEIVE THE SAME SET AMOUNT
The DTC grants the same credit to all who qualify. Whether the credit is a technical tax
provision or a tax expenditure, the credit amount should ideally vary according to costs not
otherwise already accounted for in the tax system (in the case of a technical tax provision) or
disability-related costs and/or reduced earning capacity (in the case of a tax expenditure). Using
a set amount sacrifices accuracy and fairness for administrative simplicity. As mentioned above,
there is some justification for this as disability costs are not always easy to itemize.78
3. DISABILITY MUST BE CERTIFIED BY MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS
Under the DTC, the determination of who is disabled (or perhaps, disabled enough) is primarily
left to medical professionals. Melinda Jones and Lee Ann Basser Marks have criticized the
medical certification requirements imposed by various disability policies on the grounds that
they reflect the medical model, and can be “intrusive, time consuming, and expensive.”79
Because of a lack of coordination of disability supports, the applicant may have to repeatedly
obtain medical certification to meet the requirements of various programs.80
In her article on the DTC, Raquel Chisholm describes the process of establishing disability
and gives an example of a case where “[i]t was only by portraying himself in [an] incredibly
undignified manner that [a] man was able to satisfy the criteria for the DTC.”81 In order to
qualify for the DTC, a taxpayer must focus on his or her physical, mental, or psychological
shortcomings to convince a doctor, and perhaps also a government agency or even a judge, that
she or he is impaired to a degree that warrants special tax treatment. Chisholm points out that a
credit places the person in the sick role, needing to “tug the heartstrings of the tax adjudicators
by portraying herself as fitting neatly into the stereotype of the dependent invalid.”82 In the
context of looking at disability programs more generally, Joseph Dumit explains:
[A]pplicants for disability are between a rock and a hard place. If they do dress the
part, then they are ‘acting’ ill. But if they do not then they will not be considered ill.
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Therefore their only choice is to pretend to be who they actually are, in the
institution’s view. They must work at ‘‘achieving appropriate appearance’’ … and
‘‘look and act sick’’… .83
It is not a stretch to suggest that having to play the sick role could have a negative effect on selfesteem, self-image, and identity, and may even impede wellness.84

III. JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVES ON DISABILITY REFLECTED
IN THE RECENT CASE LAW
Here, I study recent DTC cases with a view to determining the attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs
of judges in relation to disability and the appropriate policy response. A study of the recent DTC
cases reveals that some judges still appear to hold outdated views of disability that perpetuate the
medical and charitable models of disability. This is particularly concerning because the courts
have chosen to take an active role in determining who is entitled to the DTC. Here, the cases
reviewed are limited to those from 2006 to 2017 to ensure they represent relatively current views
of the judiciary.85 Where these views clash with those of the other groups already reviewed
(scholars and legislators), I explore these discrepancies.
It is important to recognize that the usefulness of cases to determine judicial perspectives
on disability is limited. As the cases are an interpretation of existing law, it is not easy to
separate the normative claims (i.e., what the law should be) from the legal claims (i.e., what the
law is). The primary role of judges is obviously to apply the law, and thus focus on the
legislators’ intentions.86 However, the language used, and even the decisions made,87 can reveal
the attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs held by judges. The focus in this discussion is not on
situations where judges simply apply the law in a rather straightforward manner; rather, the
discussion centres on judges’ language choices and situations where judges made more difficult
interpretive decisions that appear to reflect a certain understanding of disability. Similarly, my
aim here is not to evaluate the correctness of the judicial decisions, but, rather, it is to expose
views of disability that may have impacted judges’ reasoning.
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A. DISABILITY IS A TRAGEDY
The language used in some of the recent DTC cases suggests that some judges view disability as
a tragedy. For example, the word “suffers” is repeatedly used in the case of McMillan v Canada
(McMillan),88 which is contrary to the disability literature, most of which critiques the relegation
of persons with disabilities to the sick role. Similarly, judges’ offers of “sympathy” to the
disabled taxpayer in Gourlay v R (Gourlay)89 and to the parents of a disabled child in Marceau v
R (Marceau)90 reflect a charitable model of disability. As a final example, the judge’s description
of the situation in Lewis v R (Lewis),91 involving a child with vision impairment, as “tragic, and
as heartbreaking,”92 once again perpetuates the tragic and charitable models of disability.

B. PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES ARE “SICK” AND INCAPABLE
Although in at least one case (Bleiler v R)93 the judge acknowledged stereotypes affecting
persons with disabilities,94 in other cases judges have made statements that are inconsistent with
the disability literature’s focus on equality for persons with disability, variability of disability,
and social causes of disability. For example, in Fontaine v R (Fontaine)95 the Court insinuated
that only “abnormal” people would qualify for the credit,96 a view that is inconsistent with the
literature that sees disability as human variation and people with disabilities as capable and
equals. The stereotypical view of people with disabilities as necessarily incapable was also
perpetuated in other cases. For example, in Pham v Canada (Pham),97 the taxpayer’s ability to
represent himself in court was used to support a decision that the DTC requirements were not
met,98 as was the ability of the taxpayer to testify in court, work, and go to school in Walkowiak v
R (Walkowiak).99 Further, in Fontaine the Court bolstered the denial of the DTC with the fact
that the taxpayer filed a notice of appeal himself.100 What is particularly troubling is that in these
cases the Court often did little, if anything, to tie assessments of the claimants’ capabilities to
represent themselves in the legal process to the specific impairments or restrictions claimed. The
cases, along with the DTC’s application process, may encourage future DTC claimants to
underplay their abilities and assume the sick role,101 and may create further barriers to persons
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with disabilities participating in the legal system, a problem already recognized in the disability
literature.102

C. COURTS PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN DETERMINING
ELIGIBILITY
As set out above, there are three main DTC eligibility requirements set out in the ITA: (1)
function impairment, (2) marked restriction, and (3) medical certification of the first and second
requirements. Given that the legislation requires certification by medical professionals, the courts
could decide to rely on the medical certification to conclusively establish the first and second
requirements. However, it is apparent from the judicial decisions that this is not the case. This is
not entirely surprising as the function impairment and marked restriction requirements are
separate from the medical certification requirement. On the other hand, one might expect judges
to limit themselves to matters they are traditionally tasked with and thus perhaps well-positioned
to assess, such as determining credibility and interpreting unclear statements on medical forms.
However, it is clear from some cases set out below that judges have been willing to substitute
their own judgment on medical issues for that of medical professionals.
In Pekofsky v R (Pekofsky)103 and McDermid v R,104 judges appeared to consider
testimony by various parties (the children for whom the credit was being claimed, the parents,
and the medical practitioners) to assist in determining the accuracy or meaning of the doctors’
assessments on the required forms. This does not seem inappropriate as judges are experts of
these types of factual interpretations. In Pekofsky, after stating that the medical practitioner’s
opinions (in this case, two positive certificates) were not conclusive, the Court went on to satisfy
itself that the eligibility requirements were met105 by relying on testimony of the child and her
mother concerning the effect of the disability on their daily lives. The judge concluded that
“although not a psychologist myself, I was able to sense the accuracy of the conclusions reached
by the psychologists.”106
The more troubling cases are where the judges appear to give weight to their own
observations of the taxpayer’s impairment, something that one would expect medical
professionals to be in a much better position to assess. For example, in Pham the Court’s own
observations about the taxpayer’s hearing abilities, as demonstrated in court, were used to
corroborate a medical opinion.107 In Gibson v R (Gibson),108 the Court commented that the
severity of the disability was evident during the hearing.109 In Fontaine, the Court compared
ambiguous and conflicting medical certificates and concluded that the DTC requirements were
not met.110 In doing so, the Court appeared to perform its own assessment of the taxpayer’s
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cognitive state, in concluding that there was nothing “abnormal” in his testimony.111 In Pham,
the doctor’s certificate, along with testimony from the doctor, led the judge to conclude that the
requirements were not met, adding her own observations about the taxpayer’s disability to
corroborate the doctor’s evidence: “… the appellant had sufficient hearing capability to represent
himself at the hearing of his appeal. My observations during the hearing support Dr.
Finkelstein’s assessment.”112
The importance of the role of courts in determining eligibility is also highlighted in cases
where the courts were willing to consider granting the DTC despite a negative medical
certificate. In Pelletier v R (Pelletier),113 Justice Tardif relied on Buchanan v R (Buchanan)114 for
the proposition that although the Court’s role was not to substitute its own medical judgment, it
was able to determine if an unambiguously negative medical certificate should be interpreted as a
positive certificate.115 This is actually a rather surprising statement given that medical
certification that the impairment requirements are met (i.e., a positive certificate) is a specific
requirement in the legislation. In the end, the Court in Pelletier, faced with a negative medical
certificate, remained unconvinced by the evidence, including testimony by the taxpayer, that the
taxpayer was entitled to the DTC. Courts have not always been so willing to consider looking
past the certificate requirement. In the subsequent case of Islam v R (Islam),116 the Court quoted
the Federal Court of Appeal in Buchanan, which had stated that “a positive medical certificate is
a requirement of subsection 118.3(1). The Court does not have a policy-making role. If the
requirements of the Act are seen to be impracticable, it is Parliament that must address the
necessary changes.”117 While the interpretation of Buchanan in Pelletier is thus questionable, it
shows that in at least one case the judge believed he could interpret an unambiguously negative
certificate as positive and thus had a great deal of latitude in determining eligibility.
While judges have at times acknowledged the limitations imposed on them by the
legislation, they have also seemed willing in many cases to themselves evaluate impairments
based on their own observations of the taxpayer in the courtroom. In some ways, judges taking
an active role in determining whether the taxpayer qualifies for the credit may be consistent with
the disability literature critical of the power given to doctors in determining disability. 118 On the
other hand, the criticisms surrounding granting doctors too much power were, at least to a certain
extent, rooted in their inability to fully assess the situation,119 and this same concern surely
would also apply to judges assessing impairments based on their own observations of the
individual’s impairment. The scrutiny of the capabilities of the taxpayer in court, encouraging
people with disabilities to act sick and incapable and avoid participation in the legal process, is
incongruent with the disability literature. Thus, while it may be necessary for courts to interpret
the meaning and assess the credibility of medical evidence provided by professionals, judges
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need to be aware of the limitations of their own expertise, particularly in assessing functional
impairment.

D. COMPASSION PLAYS A ROLE IN DECIDING WHO IS ENTITLED TO
THE DTC
In Radage v R (Radage),120 a case that predates the decade review period in this article, Justice
Bowman stated:
If the object of Parliament, which is to give to disabled persons a measure of relief
that will to some degree alleviate the increased difficulties under which their
impairment forces them to live, is to be achieved the provisions must be given a
humane and compassionate construction.121
In Radage, Bowman J tied humane and compassionate construction to a liberal, as opposed to a
narrow or technical, interpretation of the provision.122
A number of more recent cases have acknowledged the humane and compassionate
approach set out in Radage. In some cases, it appears to be used to lend additional support to the
taxpayer’s claim. For example, in Pekofsky, this approach seems to have been used to support the
Court’s decision to patch together two medical certificates to declare that the medical certificate
requirement was met.123 Similarly, Bowman J’s humane and compassionate approach was
quoted in Benoit v R (Benoit),124 in which the Court concluded that the credit was available in the
face of contradictory medical evidence. On the other hand, while courts acknowledged this
approach in Lewis,125 Walkowiak,126 and Gourlay,127 they all decided against allowing the DTC.
Does this humane and compassionate approach conflict with the disability literature?
One could argue that all human beings, including judges, should act with compassion and
humanity towards other human beings. Disability scholars who advocate for needs-based
financial support would likely support a compassionate and humane approach that promotes a
more flexible application of the requirements, such as allowing late filing of certification, as was
done in Greenaway v R,128 and considering medical evidence to supplement the original form, as
was done in Gibson.129
On the other hand, it is peculiar that the phrase “humane and compassionate” seems to be
tied to the interpretation of the DTC in particular, whereas in the interpretation of other income
tax provisions the move away from literal or textual interpretation was justified without resort to
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sentiment or emotion,130 thus suggesting that the subjects of the DTC call for special treatment.
This idea is bolstered by the decisions in Lewis and Benoit, in which the respective courts
commented that the person under consideration was “deserving” 131 of the approach in the
circumstances. This suggests adherence to the now-denounced charitable model of disability,
under which disabled people were objects of pity and deserving of help. 132 Perhaps this approach
would be justifiable if courts made it clear that it applied to all instances involving applying tax
law to all individuals, as humans deserving of compassion and humanity, as opposed to only
persons with disabilities.

E. PROVING ENTITLEMENT TO THE DTC IS NOT AN AFFRONT TO
THE CLAIMANT’S DIGNITY
In McMillan the taxpayer argued that he should be permitted to use the DTC despite not having
filed a T2201 form. The taxpayer had been awarded a disability pension under the Canada
Pension Plan and, based on this award, he argued he should not need to produce evidence of his
disability in order to qualify for the DTC. According to the taxpayer, requiring him to re-submit
proof of his disability was contrary to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms133 (Charter) because
it amounted to double or triple jeopardy, and also violated his right to life, liberty and security of
the person.134
In an oral judgment, Justice Pizzitelli dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal. The taxpayer’s
argument that section 7 of the Charter was violated was based on a proposition that the
requirement to submit evidence of the disability was a violation of his dignity, and therefore, his
life, liberty and security of the person. The Court pointed out that while dignity might underlie
life, liberty and security of the person, it is not a stand-alone section 7 right. Further, Pizzitelli J
stated:
I fail to understand how the requirement for a medical certificate as a condition of
gaining access to a tax benefit can be an affront to the dignity of the Appellant …
Whatever anxiety, stress or stigma suffered by the Appellant in having to prove his
disability within the meaning of a provision that purports to grant a tax benefit from
the Government does not, in my view, constitute in any way a violation of section
7.135
The easy dismissal of the Charter argument in McMillian may be troubling to disability
scholars and advocates who use a human or civil rights approach to advocate for change.136
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Further, even if Charter rights are not breached, this does not mean that the qualification process
has no effect on dignity, broadly speaking. Dignity can have many meanings,137 and one
meaning centres on a person’s identity, integrity, and feelings of self-worth and self-respect.138
Disability scholars have identified dignity as an important disability policy goal. 139 It is not
difficult to see why it may be an affront to one’s dignity to be required to submit oneself to
medical evaluation and request a form that will certify that one is impaired in some capacity,
especially if it must be done repeatedly to qualify for separate programs. While a full solution to
this is not obvious, it is not clear that the courts (and perhaps more importantly, legislators) are
aware of this issue.

F. THE PURPOSE OF THE DTC IS TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE
It is generally well accepted that, under the “modern principle,” statutes, including the ITA, are to
be interpreted in light of their context and purpose, in addition to legislative intent. 140 Thus, the
courts have appropriately considered the purpose of the DTC in interpreting the provision.
On several occasions, the courts have stated that the purpose of the DTC is to provide
financial assistance to people with disabilities.141 The courts in both Gourlay and Pekofsky
quoted Johnson v R,142 which in turn quoted from Radage, in which the Court stated:
The legislative intent appears to be to provide a modest amount of tax relief to
persons who fall within a relatively restricted category of markedly physically or
mentally impaired ... [T]he object of Parliament … is to give to disabled persons a
measure of relief that will to some degree alleviate the increased difficulties under
which their impairment forces them to live … .143
Along similar lines, comments from the bench in McMillan show that there is a common
perception that the credit has a subsidy purpose: “the rationale for the DTC … was to financially
assist a person who suffers from severe and prolonged mental or physical impairment in bearing
the additional costs of living and working generated by the impairment itself.”144 Thus, the courts
appear to view the DTC as a subsidy (i.e., a tax expenditure).
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The courts’ view of the purpose of the DTC is significant as it may impact the
interpretation of the provision.145 A potential issue arises, however, when one compares the
courts’ view of the DTC as financial assistance (and thus a tax expenditure) with the views of tax
scholars and other experts, who, as previously noted, view the credit as a technical tax provision
intended to measure ability to pay and thus achieve tax fairness. 146 Although purpose is only one
of the three touchstones of statutory interpretation (the other two being text and context), a lack
of agreement with respect to the DTC’s purpose could nonetheless give rise to uncertainty in its
application where more difficult interpretive issues arise.

IV. TAXPAYER PERSPECTIVES ON DISABILITY REFLECTED
IN THE RECENT CASE LAW
The case law can also be examined to uncover the taxpayer perspective. The taxpayer in these
cases is either a person with a disability or a caregiver. There are obvious limitations with respect
to using court decisions to determine taxpayer perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs about disability
as all of these things are filtered through judges (the authors of the reasons). These taxpayers are
a small sample of all disabled people and their caregivers, and, as in any court case, the
arguments made by the taxpayers will be motivated by self-interest. Further, the group cannot be
presumed homogenous. Still, the cases do provide some insight into the beliefs of at least some
taxpayers.
Why are the views of taxpayers relevant? Their ideas about disability and the policy
response to disability, if not aligned with current law, could identify a need for policy reform.
This is particularly the case if the DTC is viewed as disability support, as many claimants of the
DTC are themselves members of the disability community, and therefore should be consulted.147
Further, examining taxpayer views may identify a lack of understanding of the provision’s
purpose or availability, in which case there may be a need for public education or simplification
of the provision. However, this can only occur after the government clarifies the DTC’s purpose.
In their appeals, the taxpayers most often argue that the existing rules should be
interpreted to entitle them to the credit. Examples include individuals with single eye blindness
in Lewis, sleep apnea in Beauchamp v R148 and Girard v R,149 food allergies in Marceau, dyslexia
in Gourlay, mental health in Cook v R, 150 seizures in Pakarinen v R, 151 headaches in Fontaine,
and diabetes in Hutchings v R.152
In other cases, it appears that the taxpayers are really arguing that the legislation should
be different than what was enacted. As an example, in the case of Ostlund v R, the caregiver of a
child with Asperger’s syndrome maintained that he should be entitled to the DTC despite the
child not meeting the marked restriction requirement.153 The parents appeared to argue that they
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should be entitled to the DTC because it was their investments in the child (including
opportunity costs) that enhanced their child’s potential.154 This seems to be at odds with
legislative intent, as the DTC was drafted in a way that seems to exclude entitlement in such
cases.
Taxpayers have also argued, in effect, that the category of family members who can
qualify to use the credit should be expanded,155 demonstrating the narrowness of the existing
rules and a disagreement between the taxpayers and legislators in terms of the appropriate scope
of the DTC. If the DTC is a tax expenditure that is intended to recognize the additional costs of
disability, it might seem to make sense to loosen the rules and allow the support person the credit
in order to indirectly support the disabled person.156 If the DTC is intended to be a technical tax
provision, DTC transfers to family members appears to be inconsistent with the ability to pay
principle157 because our system uses an individual tax unit. On the other hand, it could be argued
that the support person’s ability to pay has been reduced because of the responsibility to support
a dependent with a disability. Whether or not the concept of ability to pay would take into
account, for example, lost wages due to caregiving responsibilities is not clear.
Several taxpayers argued that the certification requirements were too onerous or
otherwise problematic. The taxpayer in Islam, for example, pointed out that it is costly and
unreasonable to get a medical certificate each year.158 In McMillian the taxpayer argued that
subjecting himself to medical examination (again) was an affront to his dignity.159 There are also
other examples of cases where taxpayers argued or suggested that qualification should be
connected to other programs.160 This is supported by academic commentary that disability
supports should be better integrated with one another.161 Thus, the views of some scholars and
taxpayers conflict with those of legislators with respect to the qualification process, though I
acknowledge that political and practical concerns may mask legislators’ views of ideal policy (as
I explain in more detail in the next section).

V. FURTHER EXPLORING THE DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS,
ATTITUDES, AND BELIEFS ABOUT DISABILITY
The foregoing examination of the DTC exposed and compared perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs
about disability and the appropriate policy response to disability. Here, I discuss further
conflicting perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs. Although this article is not focused on prescribing
policy changes, I take this opportunity to offer some possible suggestions in order to prompt
further investigation and discussion.
One problem is that lawmakers have not made the goal of the DTC clear. It is difficult to
have a policy discussion without a consensus on whether the DTC is a tax expenditure or a
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technical tax provision. The current government has initiated a review of tax expenditures,162 and
although its primary objective is to cut tax expenditures, clarifying the purpose of the DTC
should nonetheless be a part of this discussion. Is the purpose of the DTC to account for the
impact of costs of disability on ability to pay (thus, a technical tax provision)? Or, is the purpose
to provide financial support for persons with disabilities (thus, a tax expenditure)? Although tax
and disability writers have made assumptions about the purpose of the credit, either of these
interpretations could be made consistent with the normative arguments in the two bodies of
literature, provided the resulting gaps are dealt with in other distinct provisions or programs. For
example, if the government confirms the DTC is a tax expenditure, the impact of costs of
disability on ability to pay could be addressed through another provision in the ITA.
Alternatively, if the government labels the DTC as a technical tax provision, financial assistance
for persons with disabilities can be addressed through another program inside or outside of the
tax system. Once the purpose is identified, it can be widely communicated163 and reform
opportunities (such as, for example, transferability and refundability) may be identified to better
align the DTC with its purpose. This should improve perceived fairness of the DTC, thus
boosting the credibility of, and perhaps even compliance with, the tax system.
The disability studies field offers important insights into both how disability should be
viewed as well as the appropriate policy response. After examining the DTC court cases over the
past decade, it is also clear that judges’ attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs concerning disability
are often not in line with those expressed in contemporary disability literature. In a number of
cases, comments made by judges in decisions reflected stereotypical views of persons with
disabilities, thus impeding advancement of the project of promoting full participation in society.
This problem could perhaps be addressed through judicial education.
Also, it is clear that legislators’ views of disability do not align with the disability
scholarship. For example, the DTC’s focus on impairment and basic functioning ignores
important aspects of disability by failing to look to the effect of functional limitations on the
individual’s participation in society, considering relevant contextual factors. This may at least
partially be attributable to legislators’ lack of awareness of the social model or how to integrate it
into policy definitions of disability. If the DTC is a tax expenditure, legislators should, for
example, investigate the possibility of expanding the credit’s criteria such that it would be
available to those who incur significant non-deductible disability-related costs of participating in
society, including items such as transportation or housekeeping.
The preceding analysis demonstrates that many taxpayers also do not agree with the
legislators and judges with respect to what the DTC qualification criteria and process should be.
While it is likely that there will be disputes over eligibility wherever the line is drawn, legislators
and courts should strive to continue to balance fairness, administrative concerns, and certainty.
For example, the Court’s role could be clarified, and taxpayer compliance costs could be reduced
through coordination with other programs164 where appropriate.
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There are some practical and political constraints on structuring the DTC. Financial
considerations likely drive restrictive qualification criteria and monetary limits.165 Also, the tax
system tends to be a less flexible policy tool, and thus less able to respond to individual
circumstances than other policy tools, such as, for example, financial assistance programs
outside of the tax system.166 The decision to use a tax expenditure rather than a direct policy may
be attributed to federalism and the fact that the federal government has not assumed the role of
funding disability to a major extent.167 Even the decision to use a credit rather than a deduction
has a federalism aspect to it, as it leaves the provinces free to determine how much, if any, to
grant as their own disability tax relief. Finally, as with all policies of this nature, the government
needs to be concerned with the economic and equity effects of mimickers.168 The need to verify
the presence of a disability, for example, is a practical reality. These musings are not meant to
exonerate the government from poor policy choices, but to point out that there are always
practical and political constraints on policymaking. This means that the choices made may reflect
considerations other than the legislators’ views on disability.
There seems to be current political will to re-examine both disability policy and tax
expenditure policy. This is a prime opportunity to address the DTC, which lies at the intersection
of these two policy areas. However, this article demonstrates that there are differing opinions
with respect to the meaning of disability and the appropriate policy response to disability. This
prompts us to step back and have a discussion about the larger question: what do we, as a
society, owe people with disabilities?169 The time might be right for the federal government to
lead the way by engaging publicly with this question and to start making and promoting
meaningful changes to disability tax policy.
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